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HE difficult problem of distinguishing between a common and contract carrier has arisen since the coming of state regulation. The
various state commissions and courts have attempted to lay down various definitions for determining this distinction. These definitions have
varied greatly to the most extent due to the fact that the stress was
laid on the particular facts of the case to be determined rather than
upon the general problem. With this in mind it has been the purpose
of the author in preparing this article to show the evolution of this
subject from its inception to date.
* The problem is, What are the factors to be considered in determining when a carrier who is carrying goods or persons under contract
ceases to be a private contract carrier and becomes a common carrier?
In the first place we must recognize a well settled rule that a state
commission can exercise no control over a private carrier. And if a
carrier is in fact a private contract carrier a state commission cannot
label him a common carrier and thus exercise control over him. This
doctrine was laid down conclusively by the U. S. Supreme Court in the
case of Michigan Commission vs. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, where it was
held that such procedure contravened the "due process" clause in the
14th amendment.
* Member of the Madison Bar.-
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In the Duke case, the carrier there involved was carrying automobile bodies from Detroit to Toledo under three separate contracts
with automobile manufacturers. He was engaged exclusively in carrying under these three contracts and the Supreme Court held that he
was a private and not a common carrier.
The fact that he was carrying under three contracts, has caused
much confusion and has led some State Commissions to seemingly
adopt an arbitrary rule and say that any carrier operating under three
or less contracts, is a private contract carrier and therefore, not subject to regulation and control by the State Commissions.
The language of the court in the above case was as follows: P. 576:
"Plaintiff is not a common carrier. His sole business is interstate
commerce, and it is limited to the transportation covered by three contracts. He has no power of eminent domain or franchise under the
State, and no greater use of the highways than any other member of
the public body. He does not undertake to carry for the public and
does not devote his property to any public use. He has done nothing to
give rise to a duty to carry for others. The public is not dependent on
him or the use of his property for service, and has no right to call on
him for transportation."
On page 577:
"One bound to furnish transportation to the public as a common
carrier must serve all, up to the capacity of his facilities, without discrimination and for reasonable pay."
This last quotation seems to have given rise to the idea that if a
carrier limits his patrons in any manner, i.e., if he puts any restriction
on the persons or goods which he carries or for whom he carries that
he is thus holding himself out of the class of common carriers. The
idea seems clearly erroneous for it is not necessary that any common
carrier serve the whole public. Mr. Justice Holmes said in the Terminal
Taxi Cab Co. vs. District of Columbia, 241 U. S. 252,
"No carrier serves all the public. His customers are limited by
place, requirements, ability to pay, and other facts."
Again it is clearly not the manner in which carrier is actually hauling goods which determines his status, but the manner in which he
offers to haul goods. It seems clear that a carrier might well be willing
to serve anyone who came along, but if only one person happens along
to engage him, and the carrier serves this one person under a contract,
can anyone say that the carrier is any less a common carrier because
he happened to get only one customer?
Then, too, even the fact that a carrier will not serve every person
who wishes service may not be a controling factor in determining his
status as a common or private carrier, for if by his previous actions
he has established his position as a common carrier, a subsequent
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refusal to serve certain persons might be a violation of his duty as a
common carrier and not a determining factor in determining his status.
The fact that a carrier is carrying under contracts is by no means
determining as to his status. In the case of Frost Trucking Co. vs. R.
R. Commission, 271, U. S. 583 1926), the Supreme Court of U. S.
held that the defendant who was carrying citrous fruit over a regular
route between fixed termini, under a single contract and doing no other
trucking business could not be subject to control by the R. R. Commission of Cal. under State Statute. But the Court said in conclusion on
page 599-600:
"The Court below seemed to think that, if the state may not subject
the defendants in error to the provisions of the act in respect of common carriers, it will be within the power of any carrier, by the simple
device of making the private contracts to an unlimited number, to
secure all the privileges afforded a common carrier without assuming
any of their duties or obligations. It is enough to say that no such
case is presented here; and we are not to be understood as challenging
the power of the State, or of the R. R. Commission under the present
Statute, whenever it shall appear that a carrier posing as a private carrier, is in substance and reality a common carrier, to so declare and
regulate his or its operations accordingly."
In the case of Film Transport Co. vs. Michigan Pub. Util. Comimission, 17 Fed. 2nd 857 (1927), the plaintiff was engaged in transporting
moving picture films for theatres under special contracts, operating
over fixed routes, but not holding themselves out to transport for the
public indiscriminately. The Court here held the plaintiff to be a private
carrier within the rule of the Duke case, even though he was carrying
under a large number of contracts.
This seems to be perhaps the farthest that any Court has gone and
the decision and reasoning in the case is quite inadequate.
Sanger vs. Lumens, Sec. of State of Idaho, 24 Fed. 2nd 226, (1927).
Plaintiff was hauling nondescript freight for various persons under
written contracts. Page 428:
"It will thus be seen that the plaintiff holds himself out to the public and transports upon the highways all property for anyone, and by
so doing he becomes a common carrier, and cannot escape liability as
such by insisting upon private contracts with the shippers, and securing at the same time all the privileges afforded common carriers, without assuming any of their obligations or duties. A common carrier is
"one who, by virtue of his calling and as a regular business, undertakes
to transport persons or commodities from place to place, offering his
seivices to such as may choose to employ him and pay his charges.
McCoy vs. Pacific Spruce Corporation, 1 Fed. 2nd 853; 10 C. J. 39.
While a private carrier is one who, without being engaged in the busi-
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ness of carrying as a public employment undertakes to deliver goods
in a particular case for hire or reward; 10 C. J. 38, Mich. Com. vs.
Duke, 266 U. S. 570 36 A. L. R. 1105, Producers Transport Line vs.
Railroad Commissioners, 251 U. S. 228."
In the very recent case of Bruner vs. Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio, 170 N. E. 184, (Decided March, 1930), the Court held that
in defendant was a common carrier, saying: page 184:
"There is no evidence in the record which in any way proves that
Bruner rejected any business or contracted with reference thereto as
a private carrier.
We think the evidence was sufficient to sustain the judgment of
the Court below and we further note the fact that Bruner was merely
enjoined from business as a common carrier, and this injunction did
not relate in any way to the private contracts which Bruner may have
had."
The decision in this case is very short, with practically no general reasoning as to what facts constituted the defendant a common carrier.
Stoner vs. Underspeth, (Mont. 1929) 277 Pac. 437, is a very well
written and reasoned opinion covering this field very well, and the
court points out on page 440:
"It may be true that all of defendant's hauling was done under the
special contract, but even if so, the fact would not necessarily place
them in the category of private carriers every time you secure a bill
of lading, or purchase a ticket entitling you to ride on a state coach or
a railroad train, you enter into a contract for transportation, the obligation to carry you or your goods is a contractual obligation."
"A special undertaking for one man or a definite number does not
render a person a common carrier (State ex rel Pub. Util. Com. of
Utah vs. Nelson, 238 Pac. 237, 42 A. L. R. 849, Fish vs. Chapman,
2 Ga. 349, 46 Am. Dec. 393) nor does a general hiring for a single
purpose (Big Bend Auto Freight vs. Ogers, 148 Wash. 521, 269 P.
802; Purple Truck Co. vs. Campbell, 119 Oregon; 848, 250, P. 213,
51 A. L. R. 816; Mich. Pub. Util. Com. vs. Duke, 266 U. S. 570) and
such private carrier might on occasion, accommodate outsiders in an
emergency and accept compensation therefor without acquiring the
character of a common carrier; the question of good faith in such a
case is controling Big Bend Auto Freight vs. Ogers, supra).
Page 441:
The class to which a carrier is to be assigned depends upon the
nature of his business, the character in which he hold himself out to
the public, the terms of his contract, and his relation generally to the
parties with whom he deals and the public.
Holding oneself out to the public does not necessarily consist of
public declarations or advertisements; the undertaking may be evidenced by the carrier's own notice, or, practically, by a series of acts,

WHAT CONSTITUTES A COMMON CARRIER?

by his known habitual continuance in the line of business; one who
follows carrying for a livelihood, or who gives out to the world in
any intelligible way that he will take goods, chattels or persons for
transportation for hire, is a common carrier. -------------- and this
is so although the carrier has no fixed schedule of charges, does not
operate over a definite route, does not always load his vehicle to
capacity, and refuses on occasion, to accept freight or passengers
whether his vehicle is engaged or not (Cushing vs. White, 101 Wash.
172, P. 229 L. R. A. 1918 F. 463).
In Haynes vs. MacFarlane (Cal. 1929), 279 Pac. 436, the defendant carrier was hauling freight under special contracts with seven customers. The Court held him to be a common carrier and after commenting on the Frost case, 271, U. S. 583, and the Hohnes case, 240
Pac. 26, says on page 437:
"Whether the status of a freight auto truck operator is public or
private in character is primarily a question of fact in each case."
and on page 438:
"The fact that the defendant in his contract called himself a private
Carrier" could not make him such in the light of undisputed facts to
the contrary .----------------.- If such a studied attempt to evade
the provision of the statute should prove availing, the law would become a nullity, and the primary purpose of the act to regulate auto
truck transportation companies would come to naught."
In the case of Independent Truck Company vs Wright, (Wash.
1929), 275"Pac. 726, the defendant was hauling under special contracts for about sixty patrons. The court held him to be a common
carrier. The defendant relied on the following cases to support his
contention that he was a private contract carrier:
Carlsen vs. Cooney, 123 Wash. 441, 212 P. 575
Davis and Banker vs. Megcalf, 121 Wash. 141, 229 P. 2
Spokane Northwest Freight vs. Tedrow, 144 Wash. 481, 258, Pac.
31.
The court in respect to these cases, said on page 728:
"These opinions hold that transporting of merchandise under
special contract and casual tiansportation under special contract, when
indulged in in good faith, and without any intention to, under pretense
or subterfuge, engage in business as a common carrier, will not be
enjoined at the instance of the holder of a certificate of necessity the
volume of whose business may be somewhat decreased by such transportation. ---------------In our opinion the situation now before us is more nearly analagous to that which was presented in following cases: Davis & Banker vs. Nickel, 126 Wash. 421, 218 P. 198;
Davis vs. Clevinger, 127 Wash. 136, 219 Pac. 845; Barbour vs. Walker,
126 Okla, 227, 259 P. 552, A. L. R. 1049 ........
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Appellants argue that if such a contract may lawfully be made to
haul one lote of goods for one particular shipper, why cannot any number of such contracts be made? The answer to this query is that the
occasional and casual transportation of goods does not make the transporter a common carrier within the legal definition of the term, while
the more frequent carriage of goods does make the transporter a common carrier. It is impossible to lay down a fixed rule which will
definitely apply in all cases as to just when the transporter ceases to be
a private carrier and becomes a common carrier, but the general principle may easily be comprehended and where it clearly appears --------------- that the business sought to be enjoined is that of a common
carrier ------------ the further operation of the unlicensed business
will be enjoined."
Re: Fay Elliot-1929 D.P.U.R. 485 (Colo.)
On page 492-493 quotes from a decision in Wayne Trans. Co. vs.
Leopold, P.U.R. 1924 C. 382:
"Courts and commissions have repeatedly held that the distinction
between common and private carriage does not necessarily depend upon
whether written or oral contracts have been entered into, but rather
upon the nature and character of the carriage, or service rendered and
upon actual conditions of service as disclosed by testimony
There are numerous acts which tend to establish common carriage;
that all of them must exist in a particular case in order to establish
common as distinguished from private carriage, is not the law."
page 494-495:
"We believe, as have said before, that in determining whether or
not a given carrier is operating as a common carrier, the test is to what
extent he is serving the public in his field of operations----------Michigan Pub. U. Commission vs. Duke, 266 U. S. 570, it was stated
that the operator was serving three customers. It is true that they
were being served under written contract. But the important point was
not that the customers being served had written contracts; it was that
the customers were limited to three .----------- One hauling for a
sufficiently large portion of the public cannot, by the simple expedient
of having his customers sign a uniform written contract, convert himself into a private carrier."
Commission goes on to point that the doctrine that "if a carrier is
employed by one or more definite persons by special contract
he is is only a private carrier", as laid down in Hissem vs. Guran, 112
Ohio State 59, 146 N. E. 808, is out of line with the authorities.
Alichigan Pub. Util. Commission vs. Krol., Mich. 222 N. W. 718.
On page 720:
"The effects of the defendant's operation are identical with those
of common carriers. If he may, by entering into these contracts and
conducting his business in the manner testified to by him, relieve him-
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self from being placed in the class of common carriers, it will furnish
an easy way to escape liability. He was engaged in the same business
now conducted by him at the time the law became effective. He recognizd its application and twice applied for a permit thereunder. He
should not be permitted to evade the requirement of the statutes as he
is now doing.
page 719:
"The element of public service, the serving of all persons indifferently who apply for service, is recognized in all the cases. It is the
character of the business carrier that is determinative of its nature.
It is a mixed question of law and fact. What constitutes a common
carrier is a question of law."
"Whether the service rendered comes within that meaning is question of fact." Accord-Breuer vs. Ohio Public Utilities Commission.
118 Ohio St. 95, 160 N. E. 623.
Re: Jack Hirons-P.U. R. 1929 C, 279 (Cal. R. R. Commission)
Respondent contends that he is not a common carrier because he
is operating under a single contract and does not hold himself out to
serve others.
On page 283, the Commission says:
"A public or common carrier has been defined as one who undertakes for hire to transport from place to place the property of others
who may choose to employ him. Some courts have said that a common
carrier is one who holds himself out to carry goods of all persons indifferently. But the holding out which was so important a factor in
earlier definitions seems to imply no more than the existence of a
transportation business which may serve such persons as choose to
employ it. It is obviously not a prerequisite that, to be classed as a
common carrier, one must undertake to serve all persons without limitations of any kind as to the place where his services are given or the
class of goods which he professes to haul. Neither does a limitation
imposed regarding the number of shippers served, or the requirement
of an express contract in each case, prior to the rendition of the service, necessarily fix a carrier's operations as purely private. In other
words, if the particular service rendered by a carrier is offered to
all those members of the public who can use that particular service,
the public is in fact served, and the business is affected with a public
interest, though the actual number of persons served is limited."
Weaver vs. Pub. Service Comm. (Wyo. 1929) 278 Pac. 542,
Page 544:
"The making of such contracts is only one of the facts to be considered in determining whether or not a person is a private or public
carrier.
The main criterion as to whether he is the latter depends upon
whether he holds himself out as ready to serve every one of the public
alike to the limit of his capacity, and within the sphere of business
carried on by him."
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Court then goes on to say that in determining the defendant's status,
it cannot assume that the contracts for transportation in the individual
cases were merely for purpose of subterfuge and pretense.
In the very recent case of Jones vs. Ferguson, Sup. Ct. of Ark.
decided Apr. 7, 1930, and as yet unreported, the defendant had applied
to the commission for a license to operate and had been refused. Ten
merchants in a town then contracted with him to haul freight exclusively for them and the court found that he was not a common carrier.
This is almost directly contrary to a recent holding of the Minn.
Railroad and Warehouse Commission against Madden Bros. and WahlMcDonald Co. decided Feb. 17th, 1930. The Commission says:
"In the case before us the customers of respondents were limited
to the automobile distributors and dealers in cars which were manufactured at or near eastern lake ports. The "whole public" in this
case consists of the dealers and distributors of automobiles referred to
-------- The fact that the respondents have limited their
business to the transportation of automobiles is not of importance in
this proceeding for the reason that it is well accepted in the law of
common carriers that a carrier can be a common carrier of one commodity only. (Campbell vs. A. B. C. Storage and Van Co., 174 S. W.
140)."
The Commission further said:
"The statement which respondent has made about itself cannot make
it a private carrier, nor could it make itself a common carrier by failing to make such a statement. It is as most a declaration of intent. The
number of customers dealt with and occupation of the entire field of
the transportation referred to are the important facts to be considered
in determining the status of the carrier.
" In considering the business of the respondent it is significant that
the so-called contractual relationship through which respondent regards itself as a private carrier contains none of the provisions which
one would expect to find if respondent were in fact a private carrier.
It has not agreed to transport all the automobiles for any concern for
a definite period of time. The price is pot made upon a time basis, nor
for any blanket amount, but is a price or common rate to all customers
predicated upon the wheel base of the car or some similar factor. Each
shipment is made a separate contractual obligation."
The above report was quoted and discussed in the Magazine "Motor
Freight" Vol. 2, No. 4, page 23, dated April, 1930.
Similar to the Minnesota Commission's holding above, and directly
contra to the decision in the Arkansas Case of Jones vs. Ferguson,
supra, was a decision by the Pennsylvania Commission handed down
on Feb. 27, 1930, in which the defendant, Harry R. Robertson, who
had entered into an agreement with a group of merchants to haul their
freight, was restrained from further operation under the agreement,
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on the ground that he was in fact operating as a common carrier. This
order is as yet unreported in the Public Utilities Reports, but like the
Minnesota ruling, was published and discussed in the magazine "Motor
Freight", Vol. 2, No. 3, March issue, 1930.
From this group of foregoing cases we may enumerate a number
of principles which are at least important to be considered in determining a carrier's status.
1. The good faith of the carrier in question.
2. Is the carrier in question engaged in the business of transportation as a regular vocation, or merely temporarily, as a convenience, etc.
3. The proportionate size of the fielca in which the carrier assumes
to operate in comparison to the portion of field which carrier offers
service, rather than the number of contracts under which the carrier
is operating.
4. The manner in which a carrier holds himself out, rather than
the specific number of patrons being served at any particular time.
5. The nature of the carrier's business and the character of the
contracts under which he operates.
In deciding any case, the five factors mentioned above should be
used but in addition thereto, the individual merit of- the case should
be considered. The definition of a common carrier or a private carrier
is a matter of law, but the question of whethef c6r not a particular
operation is a common or private carrier is a matter of fact and as
such each individual case should be decided.
It is our belief that the trend of future decision will be to gradually
include as common carriers more of the so called contract carriers.
This will come about for the reason that regulation of common carriers is stabilizing the industry and the lack of regulation of contract
carriers is tearing down the industry. Therefore the public will itself
demand more regulation and the various regulatory bodies will, in
keeping with this demand, attempt by regulation to include more and
more operators.
This subject is yet in its infancy for the famous "Duke" case was
only decided in 1924. It is an interesting and important subject, one
that demands the best efforts of all operators interested in the advancement of the bus and truck industries.

